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An invitation to engage with the work of Margaret Jane Radin is a privilege.  
Scholars of intellectual property (IP) have particularly benefited as she has applied 
her insights on law, philosophy, and property to the novel problems in this field.  In 
her contribution to this symposium, Professor Radin has proposed that those making 
intellectual property policy and interpreting IP laws pay closer attention to the legal 
“neighborhood” of these rights—particularly, antitrust laws governing competition 
and free speech laws related to expression.  Radin’s provocative and constructive 
work suggests that courts would establish more reasonable and balanced IP doctrines 
if they took into account the policy behind competition and free speech law. 
For the most part, I agree with this perspective on the ameliorative potential of 
competition law.  Antitrust can play an important role in tailoring or limiting IP 
protections in many concentrated IP industries, where monopolists or oligopolists 
consistently try to leverage control over one product into control over all means of 
                                                                
*Associate Professor of Law, Seton Hall Law School.  I would like to thank David 
Barnhizer, the Cleveland State Law Review, and the organizers of the symposium for inviting 
my contribution.  I would also like to thank the organizers of the Seton Hall Faculty Retreat 
for permitting me to present my works in progress on search engines there.  I greatly 
appreciated the extensive comments offered by Gaia Bernstein, Marina Lao, James 
Grimmelmann, R. Erik Lillquist, Eric Goldman and Thomas Healy, and wish I had more time 
to address them in this piece.  Thanks to Charles Sullivan and Richard Murphy for their 
incisive and constructive conversations on the topic.  And I am grateful to research assistants 
Mohammed Azeez and Dean Murray for their extraordinary helpfulness and diligence. 
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selling, distributing, or even referring to it.1  The competition “neighborhood” 
promises to bring some balance and perspective to IP law, just as environmental and 
bankruptcy law symbiotically influence much CERCLA litigation, or ERISA and 
state insurance regulation lead to a nuanced (if complex) regime of pension and 
benefit law.2 
Yet I am not as confident as Radin of the salutary influence of the “free speech” 
neighborhood.  We can certainly applaud Eldred for acknowledging that First 
Amendment principles require fair use and the idea/expression dichotomy in 
copyright law.3  Important trademark “fair use” and “nominative use” cases rely even 
more directly on First Amendment law, and as Radin suggests, these principles 
should influence the evolving doctrine of “initial interest confusion.”4  Yet as Owen 
Fiss has observed, First Amendment “absolutism” can often be as formalistic as the 
Lochneresque propertization movement now dominating copyright policy.5  Rights 
to express oneself, regardless of the consequences, are not only tools for those 
marginalized by the current propertization trend, but can also be exploited by those 
at its core.   
Given the brevity of a symposium contribution, I cannot explore in detail how IP 
and First Amendment law mutually reinforce one another at the expense of 
competition policy.  However, I can comment on a suggestive recent case.  In 
SearchKing v. Google, a federal district court dismissed various unfair competition 
complaints on the grounds that search engine results are protected under the First 
Amendment.6  In SearchKing, the court simultaneously called the automation of 
search results an important reason not to hold search engines accountable for them, 
                                                                
1See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier, Resolving The Patent-Antitrust Paradox Through Tripartite 
Innovation, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1047 (2003); Matthew Fagin, Frank Pasquale, and Kim 
Weatherall, Beyond Napster: Using Antitrust to Advance and Enhance Online Music 
Distribution, 8 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 451 (2002).  
2See, e.g., Joel Gross, The Effect of Bankruptcy on Obligations to Clean Up  Contaminated 
Properties: Recent Developments and Open Issues Two Decades After Kovacs and Midlantic 
(2003), http://www.arnoldporter.com/pubs/files/Effect_Bankruptcy_Contaminated_Properties. 
pdf.  
3Eldred v. Ashcroft, 538 U.S. 186 (2003) (characterizing as “the Framers' view” “that 
copyright's limited monopolies are compatible with free speech principles” and claiming that 
the “‘fair use’ defense . . . allows the public to use not only facts and ideas contained in a 
copyrighted work, but also expression itself for limited purposes . . . [and] thereby affords 
considerable latitude for scholarship and comment.”).  
4See David W. Barnes & Teresa A. Laky, Classic Fair Use in Trademark:  Confusion 
about Defenses, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. 833 (2004); Eric Goldman, 
Deregulating Relevancy in Internet Trademark Law, 54 EMORY L.J. 507 (2005).   
5See, e.g., OWEN FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH (1996) (concentrating on First 
Amendment victories for those opposing limits on campaign expenditures, hate speech, and 
discriminatory associations); Julie Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic 
Orthodoxy of “Rights Management,” 97 MICH. L. REV. 462 (1998) (critiquing formalism of 
the new Lochnerism) . 
6Dahlia Lithwick, Google-opoloy, The Game Only Google Can Play, SLATE, Jan. 29, 
2003, http://www.slate.com/id/2D77875 (discussing the case and its implications for search 
policy). 
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and yet reached out to immunize Google’s acknowledged human intervention to bury 
results referring to a potential competitor.  Admittedly, the plaintiff in the case was 
not terribly sympathetic, and the court may just have been trying to avoid the chaotic 
consequences of exposing search engines to all manner of state laws governing 
business torts.  Nevertheless, one need not reject the court’s conclusion that a 
business tort occurred here in order to agree that some accountability for search 
engine results is increasingly necessary as they become the primary portal for net 
users. 
After discussing how search engines operate in Part I below, and setting forth a 
normative basis for regulation of their results in Part II, this piece proposes (in Part 
III) some minor, non-intrusive legal remedies for those who claim that they are 
harmed by search engine results.  Such harms include unwanted high-ranking results 
relating to them, or exclusion from a page they claim it is their “due” to appear on.  
In the first case (deemed “inclusion harm”), I propose a right not to suppress the 
results, but merely to add an asterisk to the hyperlink directing web users to them, 
which would lead to the complainant’s own comment on the objectionable result.7  In 
the latter case (deemed “exclusion harm”), complainants should have some right to a 
limited explanation of why they did not appear in highly ranked results.  Both these 
rights are based on the Fair Credit Reporting Act’s guarantee to consumers that they 
both get to correct and comment on negative information in their credit reports, and 
that they receive some account of why their credit reports might have led to a denial 
of credit. 
Given extraordinary advances in the annotation software of “wiki’s,” automation 
itself should make these basic prerogatives relatively easy to implement.  But even if 
these particular proposals are deemed implausible, they do focus attention on matters 
of principle that will have increasing importance in coming years: the 
copyrightability and First Amendment status of search engine rankings and other 
“machine speech” resulting from computerized algorithms.  Given the rapidly 
growing importance of rankers and other aggregators of information, law should not 
lightly permit machine expression to garner these protections.  Rather, they are 
merited to the extent that rankers are responsible, reflecting actual human judgment 
and providing due process to those harmed by inclusion or exclusion in relevant 
results.     
I. THE BASICS OF RANKING 
Search engines work by gathering a great deal of information and then providing 
responses to search queries.8  Once a search engine has indexed a set of web pages 
                                                                
7For now, I would limit this remedy to searches a) of a person’s name; and b) of a 
trademarked good.  For example, if a search for “American Blinds” yielded links to several 
competitors of the owner of the mark American Blinds, the owner of the mark could use the 
asterisk to indicate that such rivals were not authorized sellers of its products.  Trying to 
expand rights of control beyond these narrow categories might prove unworkable given the 
number of potential claimants to an asterisk.  For more on the parallels between names and 
trademarks, see Greg Lastowka, The Trademark Function of Authorship, 85 B.U. L. REV. 
1171 (2005).   
8See Frank Pasquale, The Law and Economics of Information Overload Externalities, 56 
VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
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and other information resources, it can generate responses to searchers’ queries.9  For 
example, if I were to type in “plastic Christmas trees” to the Yahoo! search engine, I 
would receive a page with several pieces of information.10  First, the most 
prominently displayed materials are two “paid listings” from major retailers who sell 
such trees.  Paid listings border the page, and are permitted a variety of attention-
getting design strategies.  Below them appear the search results: several web pages 
commenting on Christmas trees, and some from sellers of such trees.  The top right 
hand corner indicates that this initial page is displaying merely ten of the 3,540,000 
potentially relevant pages.  Theoretically, an obsessive searcher could review all of 
them (ten sites at a time) merely by clicking the next button on the bottom right hand 
corner of the page 354,000 times; in practice, the number of results initially 
“claimed” tends to decline as one clicks toward lower-ranked results. 
As that fanciful idea suggests, actual human inspection plays a very small role in 
search engine’s sorting and ranking of webpages.  Rather, software does nearly all 
the work.11  Although they have long tried to keep their ranking algorithms a “black 
box” to preserve competitive advantage, search engines have begun to reveal the 
basics of how their searches work.12  The basic strategy is to index pages on two 
axes: 1) relevance to the query; and 2) overall importance.  Step one, relevance, 
compares the searcher’s query with the text on the webpage, the “metatags” 
embedded in the coding of the page,13 and other aspects of the page.14  Step two, 
importance, relies on a number of heuristics, the most important being the number of 
other pages that link to the page, the number of pages that link to the linking pages, 
and so on, recursively.15   
                                                           
abstract_id=888410 (discussing this process); Niva Elkin-Koren, Let the Crawlers Crawl: On 
Virtual Gatekeepers and the Right to Exclude Indexing, 26 DAYTON L. REV., 180 (2001).    
9For a taxonomy of the types of searches now prevalent, see LOUIS ROSENFELD & PETER 
MORVILLE, INFORMATION ARCHITECTURE FOR THE WORLD WIDE WEB § 6.2 (1998). 
10See http://www.yahoo.com (results from typing “plastic Christmas trees” in the Search 
box and clicking “Web Search.”).   
11Google claims that “There is no human involvement or manipulation of results, which is 
why users have come to trust Google as a source of objective information untainted by paid 
placement,” available at http://www.reedusdesign.com/google_pagerank.htm.  But see 
Google, Inc. v. Am. Blinds & Wallpaper Factory, Inc., No. C 03-05340 JF, 2005 WL 832398 
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2005); Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., No. CIV-02-1457-M, 2003 
WL 21464568 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003).  Eric Goldman also discusses human “quality 
assurance” personnel at Google.  See Goldman, Google’s Human Algorithm, TECH. & 
MARKETING BLOG, June 5, 2005, available at http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2005/06/ 
googles_human_a.htm (last visited May 15, 2006).   
12See, e.g., Google, Technology Overview, http://www.google.com/corporate/tech.html 
(last visited Mar. 31, 2006) [hereinafter Technology Overview]. 
13To view this source code, just right-click on any webpage and then click on “View 
Source.”  This should reveal the underlying structure of and metadata in the page. 
14There can be many other aspects; “Google's order of results is automatically determined 
by more than 100 factors, including our PageRank algorithm.”  Google, Google Information 
for Webmasters, http://www.google.com/webmasters/4.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2006). 
15Technology Overview, supra note 12 (“Google uses PageRank™ to examine the entire 
link structure of the web and determine which pages are most important.  It then conducts 
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Over the past decade, the main legal controversies sparked by web rankings have 
centered on trademark law.  Mark owners have sued search engines for permitting 
competitors to appear as highly ranked results in response to a query based on the 
mark owner’s name.16  A growing amount of secondary literature has offered many 
interesting perspectives on these trademark disputes.17  However, it has not 
adequately anticipated the next generation of “ranking” controversies that will likely 
arise around two contrasting demands: 1) by those seeking privacy (who want search 
engines to remove links to sensitive, misleading, or false information); and 2) by 
those seeking publicity (who want to become more highly ranked in response to 
relevant queries).  Currently the law does little to hold search engines accountable on 
either score. 
A. Keeping Material From Being Highly Ranked 
The “privacy” or “reputational” challenges to keep materials off search results 
come from individuals, corporations, and even countries.18  Some are amusing--one 
New York Times reporter recently recounted her unsuccessful effort to keep a 
webpage featuring an unflattering photograph of herself from appearing as a high-
ranked web result when her name was queried on Google.19  More troubling was 
                                                           
hypertext-matching analysis to determine which pages are relevant to the specific search being 
conducted.  By combining overall importance and query-specific relevance, Google is able to 
put the most relevant and reliable results first.”); see also PageRank patent U.S. Patent No. 
6,285,999 (filed Jan.9, 1998) (discussing Google’s patented method of ranking pages, but not 
revealing company trade secrets that also contribute to the algorithm).   
16For example, Starbucks might object if a search query for “Starbucks” ends up with rival 
coffee shops as highly ranked results, especially if they come up as paid results.  A good 
discussion of current disputes in this area can be found in Susan Kuchinskas, Google Takes 
Hit in U.S. Trademark Case, http://www.internetnews.com/bus-news/article.php/3494406 (last 
visited May 15, 2006).  Important current cases include Government Employees Insurance 
Company v. Google, Inc., 330 F.Supp.2d 700, (E.D.Va. 2004) (granting Google’s motion to 
dismiss trademark suit based on Google’s sale of “GEICO” as an adword to GEICO’s 
competitors in the car insurance business); American Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc., 2005 
WL 832398 (refusing to dismiss key claims in American Blind’s suit to enjoin the sale of 
“American Blind” as an “adword” to competitors of American Blind).   
17The leading article here is probably Goldman, supra note 4 (proposing common law and 
statutory safe harbors for search providers accused of trademark infringement).  I generally 
agree with Goldman’s approach, although the “asterisk” proposal in Part V below would likely 
give trademark holders more rights than his proposal would envision.   
18Privacy might seem an odd term here, given the wide array of concerns expressed by 
those who want to keep certain sites off highly ranked result pages.  I am using the term in the 
general sense of the “power to share information discriminately.”  Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy 
as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 119, 121 (2004) (citing James Rachels, Why 
Privacy is Important, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 290, 294 
(Ferdinand David Schoeman ed., 1984)).  Though we have not traditionally thought of groups 
or corporations as privacy “rightsholders,” the examples given in this section should suggest 
both normatively attractive and suspect examples of situations where they might reasonably be 
considered such. 
19Stephanie Rosenbloom, Loosing Google's Lock on the Past, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2005, 
G1. (“In the winter of 1996, back when I was a brunette who wore sensible shoes, a 
photographer snapped my picture during a rehearsal for a college musical. . . . The resulting 
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2006
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Yahoo’s failure to hide a webpage that featured the pictures, name, phone number, 
and address of a woman whose ex-boyfriend had posted them in order to spite and 
humiliate her.20  Corporations have also tried to control their presentation on the web, 
trying to keep critical websites from appearing atop a websearch including their 
company names.   
Search engines’ general policy is to refuse to intervene in situations like this.21    
For example, in response to the query “Can you remove my information from 
Google's search results?,” Google answers, “We'd like to assist you, but information 
in our search results is actually located on third-party publicly available webpages. In 
order to remove your information from our search results, you'll need to contact the 
webmaster of this third-party site.”22  In its “terms of service,” Google gives a 
slightly lengthier rationale for its refusal to intervene:  
Google's indices consist of information that has been identified, indexed 
and compiled through an automated process with no advance review by 
human beings. Given the enormous volume of web site information 
added, deleted, and changed on a frequent basis, Google cannot and does 
not screen anything made available through its indices.  For each web site 
reflected in Google's indices, if either (i) a site owner restricts access to 
his or her web site or (ii) a site is taken down from the web, then, upon 
receipt of a request by the site owner or a third party in the second 
                                                           
portrait showed a pasty, gaunt girl being swallowed by a XXX-large T-shirt.  The only thing 
more unfortunate than the photo is that nearly a decade after it was taken—a decade in which I 
became a blonde and graduated to stilettos—it is still the definitive image of me on the World 
Wide Web, the one that pops up every time my name is entered in a Google search.”).  
Rosenbloom’s story was sparked by what is known as a “vanity search”: the entry of one’s 
own name into Google (usually in quotation marks) in order to see how many, and which, 
links it brings up. 
20An Oregon woman “filed suit against Yahoo for $3 million, charging that the company 
had not removed . . . photographs of her from the Web, as it had promised it would.  [The 
plaintiff’s] suit claims that an ex-boyfriend posted the pictures, her e-mail address, and her 
work phone number without permission.”  Id. 
21See, e.g., Ted Frank, Mark Maughan Sues Google Over Search Results, 
OVERLAWYERED, Mar. 28, 2004, https://www.Overlawyered.com/2004/03/mark_maughan_ 
sies_google_over.html (“CPA Mark Maughan is upset that a 2003 Google search for his name 
leads to a web page that, he says, accuses him incorrectly of wrongdoing.  So he's suing 
Google, AOL, Time Warner, and Yahoo.”).  Commenting on the case, John Battelle observes: 
“[I]n the minds of others, you are what the index says you are.”  JOHN BATTELLE, THE 
SEARCH: HOW GOOGLE AND ITS RIVALS REWROTE THE RULES OF BUSINESS AND TRANSFORMED 
OUR CULTURE 191 (2005).  In this way, the “digital person” that Dan Solove describes 
becomes accessible not merely to credit bureaus, the government, and other data collectors, 
but to the general public.  See DAN SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY 
IN THE INFORMATION AGE (2004).   
22See Google Help Center, Can You Remove My Information From Google’s Search 
Results?, http://www.google.com/support/bin/answer.py?answer=9111&topic=360 (last 
visited Mar. 26, 2006). 
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instance, Google would consider on a case-by-case basis requests to 
remove the link to that site from its indices.23 
Given the immensity of the World Wide Web, it is easy to sympathize with 
Google’s plight.  It is certainly in no position to review individually all new content 
put on the web.  That is one reason why the DMCA extended cybertort liability 
originally designed for internet service providers like Verizon to search engines like 
Google and Yahoo.24 
Nevertheless, the pleas of impotence here are a bit disingenuous.  When 
confronted by important enough entities, Google does intervene in search results.  
For example, due to a number of anti-Semites’ efforts to manipulate search rankings 
(a process known colloquially as “Google-bombing”)25, a Holocaust-denial site 
routinely appeared in the top ten results for the query “Jew.”26   In response to a 
number of complaints from the Anti-Defamation League,27 Google added a headline 
titled, “An explanation of our search results” to the top of the page.28  The linked 
                                                                
23 Google Privacy Center, Google Terms of Use for Your Personal Use, http://www. 
google.com/terms_of_service.html 
 
2417 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(B) (2000) (defining “service providers” as applied to DMCA safe 
harbor categories).  These protections cover not only internet service providers like Verizon or 
Comcast, but also search engines like Google and Yahoo. 
25Google bombing refers to “a technique through which a group of bloggers working 
together can make a webpage come up when someone searches Google for certain keywords.” 
Microcontent News, Glossary, “Google bombing,” http://www.microcontentnews.com/ 
resources/glossary/googlebomb.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2006).  Google bombing is often 
considered a type of “spamdexing.”  “[Spamdexing is defined as those techniques] employed 
by some Web marketers and site designers in order to fool a search engine's spider and 
indexing programs. The objective is to ensure that their Web site always appears at or near the 
top of the list of search engine results.” PCMag.com, Encyclopedia, “Spamdexing,” 
http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia_term/0,2542,t=spamdexing&i=51796,00.asp (last 
visited Mar. 26, 2006); see also Ira S. Nathanson, Internet Infoglut and Invisible Ink: 
Spamdexing Search Engines with Metatags, 12 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 43 (1998).    
26The site, http://www.jewwatch.com/, is an obvious hate site.   
27 See Anti-Defamation League, Google Search Ranking of Hate Sites Not Intentional, 
http://www.adl.org/rumors/google_search_rumors.asp (“The ranking of Jewwatch and other 
hate sites is in no way due to a conscious choice by Google, but solely is a result of this 
automated system of ranking. . . .The longevity of ownership, the way articles are posted to it, 
the links to and from the site, and the structure of the site itself all increase the ranking of [the 
anti-Semitic site] within the Google formula.”). 
28Google, An Explanation of Our Search Results, http://www.google.com/explanation. 
html (last visited Mar. 31, 2006) [hereinafter Explanation] (explaining that “If you recently 
used Google to search for the word ‘Jew,’ you may have seen results that were very 
disturbing. We assure you that the views expressed by the sites in your results are not in any 
way endorsed by Google. We'd like to explain why you're seeing these results when you 
conduct this search.”).  But see Goldman, supra note 4, at 533 (discussing the many ways in 
which search engines make what would traditionally be deemed editorial decisions; for 
example, they “make editorial choices about which websites to include in their database[, 
removing] websites based on a publisher's overzealous efforts to game the search engine's 
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2006
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webpage explains the reasons why the anti-Semitic site appeared so high in the 
relevant ranking and distances Google from the result.29 
The proper degree of toleration for the intolerant in a democratic society has 
vexed liberal political philosophy30 and American constitutional law31 for some time.  
It is not the place of this paper to assess whether Google’s response in this particular 
controversy was adequate.  However, the very fact that there was a response at all 
raises some interesting questions.  Do search engines have an obligation to assure 
that material appearing on the web fairly, accurately, or otherwise constructively 
relates to the query at issue?  Are certain types or sites or particularly sensitive 
information by their very nature undeserving of the type of publicity high-ranked 
results provide?  Consider, for instance, a hapless man whose name generates a 
highly-ranked result linked to a page on the site “Don’t Date Him, Girl,” (which 
permits disgruntled ex-wives and ex-girlfriends to post in great detail the 
shortcomings of their former husbands or boyfriends).32  If it is true, or “merely” an 
opinion, he can’t sue the poster for defamation.33  But should this be the end of the 
story—his web presence forever compromised by a virtual “scarlet letter” attached to 
his name?34  
                                                           
system or due to liability concerns.  In other cases, search engines may choose not to index 
certain websites based on the costs and benefits of catering to esoteric interests.”). 
29Explanation, supra note 28. 
30See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM xiii (1993).  
31See, e.g., DONALD ALEXANDER DOWNS, NAZIS IN SKOKIE: FREEDOM, COMMUNITY AND 
THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1985); PHILIPPA STRUM, WHEN THE NAZIS CAME TO SKOKIE: 
FREEDOM FOR SPEECH WE HATE (1998). 
32See The Bitch, Refuse, Rebuff, Reject, Repel, Repulse, MIAMI NEW TIMES, Sept. 22, 2005 
(“Tasha Joseph, a furiously scorned Miami-based publicist . . . decided to take action.  ‘You 
can do a background check for an employee. Why can't you do one for a potential boyfriend?’ 
she says.  Joseph launched the Website dontdatehimgirl.com this past summer.  Since July, 
more than a hundred community-minded women have posted profiles and photos of men 
caught cheating . . . .  Joseph says her site has been receiving about 2500 hits per day.”).  Dan 
Solove has written extensively, and persuasively, about the dangers of untrammeled rights to 
publish even true information.  See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less: 
Justifying Privacy Protections Against Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 967 (2003).   
33 Dontdatehimgirl.com is not a mere hobbyist’s entertainment, but rather aspires to be the 
“universal dating background check tool.”  Kimberly Palmer, Should Cheaters be Outted 
Online?, CHICAGO TRIBUNE REDEYE, Oct. 20. 2005, at 2  (“Joseph, who at 33 is in what she 
calls a ‘committed’ relationship, envisions the site as an empowering tool for women. If every 
cheating guy is eventually posted, it will become the universal dating background check tool, 
she says.  And she's not worried about getting sued, mostly because she had a team of lawyers 
help her set up the site and create a terms of use form that women have to agree to before 
posting cheaters.  ‘We put the onus on women who use the site to make sure she's telling us 
the truth. . . . We have no liability,’ she says.  Plus, she adds, ‘Truth is the absolute defense to 
libel.’”).   
34 Law seems to take an interest in preventing such embarrassment by banning 
blackmail—which, as James Boyle notes, is a rather odd exception to information economics’ 
general endorsement of contractual control over information.  See James Boyle, A Theory of 
Law and Information: Copyright, Spleens, Blackmail, and Insider Trading, 80 CAL. L. REV. 
1413 (1992).  (discussing several leading scholars’ effort to resolve the “paradox” of 
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol54/iss1/7
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Search engines like to advise individuals and companies who don’t like the 
current highly-ranked results associated with them to engage in self-help—by trying 
to persuade the offending poster to take down or modify their site, by creating their 
own highly ranked information, and by purchasing “adwords” to assure highly 
ranked “paid results” above and to the side of unpaid results.35  For example, if Wal-
Mart is deeply unhappy that two critical sites come up in the top five responses to the 
query “Walmart,” it could eventually create a group of well-connected “supportive” 
sites that eventually displace “Walmart Watch” and the “Walmart Movie.”  It could 
also purchase several relevant “adwords” (such as “sex discrimination” or “low 
wages”) to assure that such sites appear in “paid results” listings near results listings 
generated by queries for critical sites.36  Search engines give a number of tips on how 
those concerned with search results can attempt to secure better placement for their 
sites37--and, in turn, displace unflattering material or contextualize it with purchased 
links.38  
B. Getting Material Highly Ranked 
So far, search engines’ laissez-faire approach to complaints about ranking results 
may appear well-founded.  They claim to be merely directories of websites and not 
to generate content themselves.39  Those dissatisfied with results can put up their 
own rival content or pay for an advertisement connected to key queries.  Given these 
opportunities, search engines claim that they are just one more forum in the 
“marketplace of ideas” which give the disgruntled more than adequate opportunity to 
respond to or reconfigure search results they dislike. 
                                                           
blackmail law); see also Cosby v. Jackson, 741 F. Supp. 740 (N.D. Ill. 1970).  
Dontdatehimgirl.com does offer some measure of self-help, a chance for the accused to 
present “his side of the story.”  Nevertheless, the “asterisk” solution proposed in Part V below 
provides a more systematic approach. 
35See, e.g., Google, Google Can Help Your Business Make More Money, http://services. 
google.com/marketing/links/US-HA-CMBNINE2 (last visited Apr. 1, 2006). 
36For an account of adword auctions, see DAVID VISE & MARK MALSEED, THE GOOGLE 
STORY 116-18 (2005) (“Companies of all sizes were participating in these keyword auctions, 
spending anywhere from hundreds of dollars to many millions each quarter on Google.”).    
37See, e.g., Google, Google Information for Webmasters: Webmaster Guidelines, 
http://www.google.com/intl/en/webmasters/guidelines.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2006). 
38See Rosenbloom, supra note 19, at G1 (“‘The trick . . . is if you can get lots of people 
that have a great PageRank to link to you, you're going to be driven up very high.’  
[Therefore], the secret to burying unflattering Web details about yourself is to create a 
preferred version of the facts on a home page or a blog of your own, then devise a strategy to 
get high-ranking Web sites to link to you.  Many people assume that a Google ranking has 
something to do with Web traffic, but that is incorrect, as is the notion that the more links a 
site has, the higher its PageRank.  A PageRank can be high even if a Web site is linked to only 
once, Ms. Mayer of Google said, provided that the one link is itself a highly ranked page.”). 
39Goldman provides a number of reasons to dispute this claim.  See Goldman, supra note 
4, at 532-33 (“[I]t is 100% wrong to treat search engines as passive agents for publisher 
content.  Search engines are media companies, not neutral providers of information.  Thus, 
search engines often view their search database as a proprietary asset that they tightly control 
to provide a quality user experience and, not coincidentally, maximize profits.”).  
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However, efforts to displace unfavorable information may ultimately increase its 
visibility, as “important” websites may be drawn to comment on the efforts 
themselves.40  Search engines do not want website publishers to get too adept at 
manipulating the rankings, and routinely punish those who they say unfairly 
influence their results.  Although Google gives webmasters a number of general 
suggestions on how to increase the rank of their websites, they warn against hiring 
certain unsavory “Search Engine Optimizers” (“SEO’s”) companies which attempt to 
increase one’s rank in response to relevant (and sometimes not-so-relevant) queries.41  
As litigation recently revealed, at least one search engine “buried” the website of a 
Search Engine Optimizer under dozens of other listings in order to punish the 
company for manipulating page rankings.42  After becoming aware of the SEO 
SearchKing’s strategy to increase its clients’ ranking, “Google knowingly and 
intentionally decreased the PageRanks assigned to  . . . SearchKing,” greatly 
diminishing potential clients’ ability to find SearchKing via a Google search.43 
At first glance, this seems like perfectly reasonable behavior—the search 
engine’s unpaid rankings are both a public service and the foundation of its 
commercial enterprises, and it has a right to maintain its integrity.  Moreover, the 
unpaid rankings are only commercially feasible given the paid rankings, and not 
many website owners would pay for rankings if they could easily assure top 
placement via other means.  Yet search engines’ secrecy regarding the way they rank 
pages makes the whole idea of “fair” or “unfair” ranking manipulation exceptionally 
vague.44  If site owners have only a vague idea of what counts as a legitimate factor 
in webpage ranking, they have little idea of whether their tactics are a brilliant 
maneuver that will lead to cyberfame or a censured ploy that will consign them to 
anonymity.45    
                                                                
40For example, when a California accountant sued search engines for reporting contested 
professional disciplinary action against him as the first result attached to his name, the popular 
website Overlawyered increased the prominence of his disgrace by mocking his litigiousness.  
See BATTELLE, supra note 21, at 191.  It is possible that other self-help measures would be 
similarly self-defeating, enhancing the notoriety of the very site they are designed to occlude. 
41Google, Google Information For Webmasters: Search Engine Optimizers, http://www. 
google.com/intl/en/webmasters/guidelines.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2006) (“Many SEOs 
provide useful services for website owners, from writing copy to giving advice on site 
architecture and helping to find relevant directories to which a site can be submitted. However, 
a few unethical SEOs have given the industry a black eye through their overly aggressive 
marketing efforts and their attempts to unfairly manipulate search engine results.”).   
42Search King, Inc., 2003 WL 21464568, at *2.  After offending Google with its tactics for 
elevating its clients rankings, Search King would not show up on a search for “Search King” 
until many pages after the initial results page—though it obviously appeared to be the most 
relevant response to such a search. Id. 
43Id. 
44Google's mathematical algorithm is a trade secret, and it has been characterized as one of 
its most valuable assets.  See Frederick Townes, SEO [Search Engine Optimization] vs. 
Marketing: The Fine Art of Copywriting, SEARCH GUILD, available at http://www.search 
guild.com/article772.html.  
45For example, if I pay an “important” site to link to my site, in order to enhance its 
ranking, I have little idea whether this approach will be rewarded or condemned.   
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Despite these paradoxes, the SearchKing controversy ultimately gave search 
engines little to worry about.  Following earlier decisions that deemed bond rating 
agencies’ assessment of firms’ creditworthiness protected speech, the court found 
that Google’s page rankings were an opinion protected under the First Amendment.46  
Google, and by implication other search engines, had no obligation to assure that 
their published results were actually generated by the “objective,” unmanipulated 
algorithm that they claim produces them.47   
There are several reasons to object to such blanket protection for search results.  
The court may call rankings opinions, but the world does not treat them as such; 
rather, the more dominant a search engine is, the more its ranking is treated as (and 
becomes) a fact about the relevance, quality, and prominence of the ranked.  Given 
that the purported “objectivity” of rankings and lack of human intervention is the 
main reason why search engines refuse to review or remove links to the material 
mentioned above,48 the legal protection of their capacity to alter results at will, and 
secretly, is curious at best.  Search engines serve valuable social functions, but 
indiscriminate application of First Amendment immunities to their results provides 
unnecessarily expansive protections.49 
II. TWIN GOALS FOR SEARCH LAW: RESPONSIBLE AND AUTHORITATIVE METADATA 
As book publishers, news agencies, and others launch copyright lawsuits against 
Google, information law appears eminently capable of scuttling search engines’ 
quest for an authoritative index of materials.  However, outside of a few trademark 
disputes, plaintiffs appear incapable of supporting minimal demands for responsible 
publication of search results.  This is unacceptable in an age of data proliferation, as 
metadata (the organization and classification of data) becomes an ever more 
                                                                
46Search King, Inc., 2003 WL 21464568, at *3 (“Two questions remain.  First, are 
PageRanks constitutionally protected opinions? Second, if PageRanks fall within the scope of 
protection afforded by the First Amendment, is the publication of PageRanks per se lawful 
under Oklahoma law, thereby precluding tort liability premised on the intentional and even 
malicious manipulation of PageRanks by Google? The Court answers both questions in the 
affirmative.”). 
47Id. at *4 (“[T]he Court finds that under Oklahoma law, protected speech-in this case, 
PageRanks-cannot give rise to a claim for tortious interference with contractual relations 
because it cannot be considered wrongful, even if the speech is motivated by hatred or ill 
will.”).   
48As Google avers in response to queries about objectionable rankings, “The order and 
contents of Google search results are completely automated. No one hand picks a particular 
result for a given search query . . . .” Google Help Center, Principles, http://www.google. 
com/support/bin/topic.py?topic=368 (last visited Apr. 1, 2006) [hereinafter Principles]; see 
also Stepforth, The SEO Blog: Are Google SERPs Entirely Organic?, http://news.stepforth. 
com/blog/2006/02/are-google-serps-entirely-organic.php (last visited Apr. 2, 2006) 
[hereinafter SEO Blog]. 
49See also Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Rebooting Cybertort Law, 80 WASH. 
L. REV. 335 (criticizing CDA immunities for ISP’s (such as search engines) as overbroad); 
Eugene Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1095 (2005) (cataloging limits 
to First Amendment protection for speech that induces or enables certain crimes).  
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important resource for navigating oceans of expression.50  Some balance is needed 
before copyright law turns the Internet into a pay-per-use anticommons51 and 
misguided First Amendment concerns render search engines entirely unaccountable 
for the results they provide.  In an increasingly fragmented, strident, and 
sensationalistic media environment, there is ever more need for authoritative and 
responsible providers of metadata.  Each of these aspirational terms is described in a 
bit more detail below. 
Authoritativeness:  Librarians, archivists, and collectors have always dreamed of 
a comprehensive source of data—one that includes all relevant material in a single 
index.  With the advance of digitization and interconnection, there is no technical 
obstacle to such a “celestial jukebox,” “new library of Alexandria,” or consolidated 
collection of all types of expression.52  As technology governed by Moore’s Law 
advances, storage and search costs continue to decline.53  However, legal and 
business obstacles to authoritativeness appear to arise as quickly as technical barriers 
come down.  Certainly some of these projects, like digital rights management54 and 
the development of commercial “deep webs”55 available only to those licensees, may 
be necessary to secure compensation to copyrightholders and other entrepreneurs.56  
                                                                
50As David Weinberger comments on the Google Print controversy, “[D]espite the present 
focus on who owns the digitized content of books, the more critical battle for readers will be 
over how we manage the information about that content--information that's known technically 
as metadata.”  David Weinberger, Crunching the Metadata: What Google Print Really Tells 
Us About the Futuer of Books, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 13, 2005, at E3. 
51An anti-commons develops when fragmented ownership causes high transaction costs 
that stunt the development of a resource.  Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the 
Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 
(1998).  Just as Garrett Hardin observed that insufficient propertization could lead to overuse 
of resources, anticommons theorists show how excessive propertization can lead to underuse 
of resources. Id. at 624 n.10.  
52See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL 
JUKEBOX (2003); Charles C. Mann, The Heavenly Jukebox, ATLANTIC, Sep. 2000, available at 
http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/2000/09/mann.htm; Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative 
Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 263 (2002). 
53Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the New 
Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 270-71 (2002).  
54Digital Rights Management (DRM) is defined as a "system for authorizing the viewing 
or playback of copyrighted material on a user's computer or digital music player. DRM has 
centered around copyrighted music, with Apple's FairPlay and Microsoft's Windows Digital 
Rights Manager being the two predominant DRM systems. Video DRM is on the horizon as 
broadband Internet and more highly compressed video formats take hold."  The Free 
Dictionary, “DRM,” http://computing-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/DRM. 
55“The ‘Deep Web’ refers to content available online that is not indexed by search 
engines.  This content may be inaccessible to search robots because the content is presented on 
dynamically generated pages, which the robots cannot access.”  Goldman, supra note 4, at 533 
n.76 (citing Michael K. Bergman, The Deep Web: Surfacing Hidden Value, 7 J. ELECTRONIC 
PUB. 1, Aug. 2001, available at http:// www.press.umich.edu/jep/07-01/bergman.html).   
56Admittedly, some predict that untrammeled “deep webs” will ultimately make general 
purpose search engines’ business model untenable.  See Jack Shafer, The Great Google 
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But the mere indexing and archiving of works—the core of the Google Print 
project—has little if any negative commercial impact on information creators.  
Holdouts should not be permitted to stop this project in the same way that permission 
culture has crippled innovation in the music and film industries.57 
Responsibility: Nevertheless, as Socrates reminds us, the best physician is also 
often the best poisoner.58  As search engines become more authoritative, 
encompassing more and more sources of data, they are also likely to become more 
important sources of information in our daily lives.  If an individual has some rights 
to control personally identifiable information in the transfer of bank, medical, and 
video store records, shouldn’t similar protections apply to search results?  Moreover, 
in a world where dates, employers, and even casual acquaintances “google” the 
individuals they meet and companies they do business with, shouldn’t the “googled” 
have some opportunity to present their side of the story in response to potentially 
misleading, biased, or merely cruel links?  Finally, if search engines can evade 
responsibility in the foregoing scenarios by pointing to the automation of their 
services, shouldn’t they also have some legal obligation to actually follow the 
algorithms they claim to adhere to?59  Internet policymakers should address each of 
these concerns in coming years; I propose some small steps toward accountability in 
Part V below. 
                                                           
Wipeout: Chronicle of a Corporate Death Foretold, SLATE, Nov. 21, 2005, 
http://www.slate.com/id/2130795 (predicting that a growing proprietary “deep web” kept out 
of search engine indexes may eventually render search engine results trivial as the most 
important and relevant sites opt out of their indices).  To the extent the “deep webs” 
accomplish this isolation via technical measures, there may be little law can do to stop their 
development. 
57Examples are legion; several participants at the Harvard Signal or Noise conference 
described spending dozens of hours attempting to hunt down the owner of tiny snippets of 
music, only to be confronted with near-extortionate demands for a license. Signal or Noise? 
The Future of Music on the Net, Briefing Book, available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/ 
events/netmusic_brbook.html.  The owners of copyrights in the television show The Simpsons 
demanded $10,000 for a ten-second clip that a documentary filmmaker wanted to insert into 
his work.  See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 96 (2004).  See also Center for Social 
Media, Copyright and Fair Use, http://www.centerforsocialmedia.  org/resources/fair_use/ 
(last visited May 15, 2006) (discussing controversies); KEMBREW MCLEOD, FREEDOM OF 
EXPRESSION®: OVERZEALOUS COPYRIGHT BOZOS AND OTHER ENEMIES OF CREATIVITY (2005).      
58“As Socrates points out in Book I of the Republic, the outstanding doctor, by virtue of 
his technical knowledge of medicine and the human body, also makes the best poisoner.”  
Peter Berkowitz, Other People’s Mothers, NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 10, 2000, at 27, available at 
http://www.peterberkowitz.com/otherpeoplesmothers.htm (reviewing PETER SINGER, 
PRACTICAL ETHICS (1993)). 
59The FTC has warned sites to disclose which are paid and which are unpaid rankings.  A 
similar proviso regarding “humanly manipulated” ranks may be in order.  Danny Sullivan at 
Search Engine Watch has also proposed that search engines should at least indicate that a 
government-censored site may be relevant, even if it is legally required not to show the site. 
Danny Sullivan, Got To Censor Search Listings?  Why Not Disclose?, Search Engine Watch 
Blog, Sep. 27, 2004, http://blog.searchenginewatch.com/blog/040927-093434.  Google 
apparently already does this in response to European restrictions on content (such as body 
modification sites), but it is not clear if Google.cn will follow such a policy in China. Id.  Alan 
Davidson, Presentation at Yale Search Engine Conference, Dec. 5, 2005, available at 
http://islandia.law.yale.edu/isp/regulatingsearch.html (last visited May 15, 2006).   
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Authority and responsibility can be mutually reinforcing.   As the costs of 
comprehensiveness decline, the costs of entry into the search market decline.  As 
more search services emerge, the stakes of inclusion or exclusion in any particular 
directory decline.  Lower stakes make responsibility an easier task, as the process 
due is should be proportional to the harm inflicted by any given inclusion in or 
exclusion from search engine results.60   
As Helen Nissenbaum and Lucas Introna argued in their seminal piece on the 
development of search engines, these information providers are not merely one 
among many voices on the World Wide Web.61  They organize and rank all the rest, 
acting as a “public good” as indispensable as phone books, traffic signals, or 
lighthouses.62  We all gain when authoritative, comprehensive search engines can 
refer us to all the webpages, books, and other media relating to the topics that 
interest us.  Yet we all stand to lose if increasingly authoritative search engines do 
not act responsibly when publishing and disseminating the information they gather.   
Unfortunately, information law appears to aid the development of partial and 
irresponsible search engines.  If things are to change, the negative consequences of 
absolute rights granted pursuant to copyright and the First Amendment must be 
quantified, or at least subject to economic analysis.  I examine the copyright side of 
the equation in another piece, proposing special fair use protections for categorizers 
and indexers.63  Here, I concentrate on the untoward consequences of irresponsible 
search engine results in a concentrated search engine market and propose some legal 
responses. 
III. ENCOURAGING DOMINANT SEARCH ENGINES TO BE RESPONSIBLE 
As Google, Yahoo, MSN, and other leading search engines become 
extraordinarily powerful research tools, society’s interest in comprehensive 
collections of information is advanced.  But is there a downside to such authoritative 
search engines?  To the degree that the search engine market is not merely 
authoritative, but also concentrated, the answer is yes.  All those harmed mentioned 
in Part II above—ranging from those unable to keep misleading or embarrassing 
information from being associated with given queries, to those who felt they 
deserved more prominent placement—would find their troubles exacerbated to the 
extent that any given search engine, or small group of search engines, became 
                                                                
60American due process jurisprudence has generally scaled the amount of “process due” to 
the gravity of deprivation caused by government action.  See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 
319 (1976). 
61Lucas D. Introna & Helen Nissenbaum, Shaping the Web: Why the Politics of Search 
Engines Matters, 16 INFO. SOC’Y 3 (2000), available at http://www.nyu.edu/projects/nissen 
baum/papers/searchengines.pdf. 
62See Carol Rose, Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Comerce and Inherently Public 
Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711 (1986) (discussing the treatment of libraries and 
lighthouses). 
63See Pasquale, supra note 8.  Focusing on the “authoritativeness” goal, that piece argues 
that, in an era of information overload, comprehensive collections and categorizations of 
information are becoming ever more important to our economic and psychological well-being.  
Id.  Building on my earlier work on the fourth fair use factor, I argue for favorable treatment 
for categorizers and organizers of information under the first of the statutory fair use factors.  
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authoritative information sources.  Moreover, there are other negative externalities 
arising from dominant rankings systems generally, which Section IV(A). below 
addresses.  
Individuals’ limited capacity (or willingness) to process information is the main 
reason why high-ranking search engine results are so important.  Though literally 
thousands or millions of results can appear in response to a query, only about ten to 
fifteen can appear on the first page.  Of these, the first unpaid result is likely to get 
ten times the traffic as the tenth, and twice that of the second.  The resulting 
competition has created various strategies to influence rankings, which in turn drive 
search engines to make their ranking algorithms more opaque.  Rankings can also 
generate self-fulfilling prophecies, whereby the top-ranked site may become the most 
popular and successful one, regardless of its merits.64 
Though some might argue that strong copyright protection would ameliorate such 
problems, by reducing the power of search engines, in fact the reverse is true: 
policies that cheapen the data necessary for search engine comprehensiveness also 
advance the ultimate solution to negative externalities from a concentrated search 
market: namely, a diversity of search engines as ranking resources.  In a world where 
search engines have to bargain with every rightsholder, only the wealthiest 
companies could maintain the legal staff necessary for such an endeavor—which 
would probably be Sisyphean to boot.65  If search engines eventually gain fair use 
protections for indexing and providing samples of content, far more entrants could 
compete in this market.    
Nevertheless, we cannot expect such a competitive market to arise organically, 
even if search engines manage to succeed in copyright litigation.  The economics of 
search predict that, in any given market for information, there are enormous returns 
to scale—individuals are going to seek out the most comprehensive and authoritative 
source of information, and the very fact that this occurs gives the leading source 
enormous leverage to assure that information sources will want to appear (and be 
highly ranked) on its search results.66  Growing numbers of searches on a given 
                                                                
64A commenter on John Battelle’s blog discusses this in the context of searches for sites 
about the Civil War.  “Thus, a person unschooled in search might start with a broad term, such 
as ‘civil war’—because that's the way we used to search for things in books and catalogs—she 
already knows to think a bit before hitting send to identify much more specific search terms 
likely to approach unique for what she needs: e.g., ‘bloodiest battle civil war.’”  Tim Windsor, 
Comment, John Battelle’s Search Blog, available at  http://battellemedia.com/archives/001863 
.php 
65See Gary Wolf, The Great Library of Amazonia, WIRED, Oct. 24, 2003 (describing 
Amazon’s painstaking efforts to convince, coax, or coerce the owners of 100,000 book titles to 
participate in its “Look Inside The Book” program).    
66See DAVID A. VISE & MARK MALSEED, THE GOOGLE STORY 215 (2005): 
[T]he potent Googleware blend of software and hardware gave the company more 
computing power than anyone else.  It would not be easy for a newcomer to match its 
raw scale, said Peter Norvig, director of search quality.  “We’re like Dell,” he said, 
referring to the way Google assembled and customized each of the personal computers 
in its vast network.  Moreover, prior to each product rollout, Brin and Page scrutinized 
the product’s potential for rapid scaling up so that they could maintain a competitive 
advantage through size and distribution even as other mimicked and matched the 
ideas.   
15Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2006
130 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:115 
service give that service ever more data to refine and improve its index.67  The “rich 
get richer,” making the search and rankings field a very difficult one to enter. 
To the extent that search is a natural monopoly or oligopoly, government must 
try to assure that search engines are responsible for their results.  The final section of 
this part tentatively suggests some potential reforms based on prior interventions in 
parallel information industries.  Not only would such regulation check the worst 
aspects of dominant search engines, it might also tend to deconcentrate the market if 
it were only applied to “major” search engines. 
A. Negative Externalities of Ranking 
Creative organization of data (and concomitant generation of metadata) can 
counteract the negative effects of information overload.  Unfortunately, ranking, a 
powerful and almost inevitable method of organizing data, has its own negative 
externalities.  Unlike rating, which usually permits a number of rated entities to 
occupy some terrace of status, ranking creates a zero-sum game in which any one 
advance leads to other displacements.  The resulting struggle is particularly acute on 
search engines, where the top-ranked site is likely to get twice the traffic of the 
second-ranked site and ten times the traffic of the tenth ranked site.68 
The importance of ranking is regularly discussed by leading authors in the field 
of web-site promotion:  
There is competition for those top ten seats. There is serious competition. 
People are trying to take away the top spots every day. They are always 
trying to fine tune and tweak their HTML code and learn the next little 
trick. The best players even know dirty ways to ‘bump off’ their 
competition while protecting their own sites.69 
Economists have explored how positional dynamics in a number of different 
markets (including housing, test preparation, and automobiles) have led to socially 
wasteful “arms races” for positional advantage.  In ordinary markets, the presence of 
high-spending consumers will draw more producers so that, eventually, supply will 
approach demand.  However, there can only be one “top-ranked” site.70  Tactics to 
                                                           
Id.  For economic theory predicting such returns to scale in information industries, see HAL R. 
VARIAN & CARL SHAPIRO, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE NETWORK 
ECONOMY (2000); Hal R. Varian, Economics and Search, Aug. 1999, available at 
http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/~hal/Papers/sigir/sigir.html. 
67For example, if 100 people search for “skis” on a search engine on a Tuesday, and all 
pick the third-ranked result, the search algorithm may adjust and put that result as the first 
result the next day.  The most used search engine will have more data to tweak its algorithms 
than its less-used rivals.  We should then expect its algorithms to better reflect mass taste, and 
in turn to draw in more of the data that permits it to do so.   
68See Jakob Nielsen, The Power of Defaults, USEIT.COM, Sept. 26, 2005, 
http://www.useit.com/alertbox/defaults.html; see also Nico Brooks, The Atlas Rank Report: 
How Search EngineRank Impacts Traffic, ATLAS INSTITUTE DIGITAL MARKETING INSIGHTS, 
June 2004, available at http://app.atlasonepoint.com/pdf/AtlasRankReport.pdf 
69Introna & Nissenbaum, supra note 61, at 14. 
70It is easy to see how spending could spiral out of control for such spots.  There are only 
twenty universities ranked in the “Top 20” by U.S. News & World Report, regardless of the 
level of demand for slots at Top 20 schools. Even if we go from a society where 50%, instead 
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influence unpaid listings and prices for paid listings are sure to escalate, but it is not 
clear that this competition creates much utility.71  
As Robert H. Frank and Cass Sunstein have observed, “In many contexts, 
consumers find themselves on a positional treadmill, in which their choices do not 
really make them happier or better off, but instead serve largely to keep them in the 
same spot in the hierarchy.”72  For example, if one applicant buys a designer suit 
before an interview, he may well look better than all the other applicants; but if all 
applicants do the same, no one gains any advantage, and each is out the cost of the 
suit.73  As search engines become more important guides to products and services 
and advertising budgets continue to migrate toward them, we can expect more 
wasteful jockeying for “top spots” in response to search queries.74   
                                                           
of 5%, of high schoolers aspire to be in such a school, or where potential students have 
$200,000, as opposed to $20,000, in resources to apply to education,  there can only be twenty 
Top 20 schools.  Perhaps this is why top universities continue to fundraise while barely 
spending returns on extant endowments.   
71Newspapers and other traditional venues for advertising also worry that, to the extent all 
(or the most desirable) consumers begin to use search engines as one-stop sources of 
information on goods and services, vital sources of revenue may be diverted from them.  
Given the extraordinary profitability of such media over the past twenty years, it is hard to 
take these objections seriously currently.  However, it is important to note that even as search 
engines may cross-subsidize socially useful functions (such as the indexing of “research 
space”) with revenues from advertising, they may be undercutting the position of other media 
to do so.  
72Robert H. Frank, The Demand for Unobservable and Other Nonpositional Goods, 75 
AM. ECON. REV. 101, 102-03 (1985) (asserting that workers will work under less optimal 
conditions to maintain relative position compared to coworkers).   
73Robert H. Frank, H. J. Louis Professor of Econ., Johnson Graduate School of Mgmt., 
Cornell Univ., Address Before Australian Economics Association: Are Positional Externalities 
Different? (Oct. 28, 2003), available at http://www.bu.edu/econ/seminars/micro/pdffall03/ 
Frank.pdf.  
74See Robert H. Frank and Philip J. Cook, The Winner-Take-All Society 130 (1995) 
(discussing Richard Thaler, The Winner’s Curse: Paradoxes and Anomalies in Economic Life 
(1992)).  The winner’s curse has been a widely acknowledged phenomenon among investors; 
as one popular business site notes, it is “A tendency for the winning bid in an auction to 
exceed the intrinsic value of the item purchased.  Because of incomplete information, 
emotions or any other number of factors regarding the item being auctioned, bidders can have 
a difficult time determining the item's intrinsic value.  As a result, the largest overestimation of 
an item's value ends up winning the auction.”  See Investopedia, “Winner’s Curse,” 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/w/winnerscurse.asp (last visited May 19, 2006); see also 
Barry Schwartz, The Paradox of Choice: Why More is Less 194 (2004) (citing Thomas  C. 
Schelling, Micromotives and Macrobehavior (1978)): 
It’s like being in a crowded football stadium, watching the crucial play.  A spectator 
several rows in front stands up to get a better view, and a chain reaction follows.  Soon 
everyone is standing, just to be able to see as well as before.  Everyone is on their feet 
rather than sitting, but no one’s position has improved.  And if someone, unilaterally 
and resolutely, refuses to stand, he might just as well not be at the game at all.  When 
people pursue goods that are positional, they can’t help being in the rat race.  To 
choose not to run is to lose.   
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Competition for rank also tends to lead to a destructive dynamic of gaming and 
opacity.  The search engine optimizer (SEO) industry has long attempted to give 
advice to webmasters on how to increase their visibility.  The line between legitimate 
and illegitimate tactics is blurry, and search engines are quick to alter their 
algorithms in order to thwart the latter and encourage the former.  They consider 
these algorithms their most important asset, protecting them with a forbidding wall 
of trade secret, copyright, patent, and paracopyright protection.  As algorithm 
transparency gives way to opacity, SEO’s engage in ever more desperate tactics, 
leading to new rounds of surveillance and secrecy.75 
Perhaps if we could be sure that all searches were running according to these 
algorithms, without human intervention, we could accept this opacity, assured that 
skilled “reverse engineers” could eventually make sense of the rating system.76  
However, self-serving intervention has been documented.  Google has not merely 
punished “bad” search engine optimizers by making them “disappear” from relevant 
rankings, but it reportedly manipulated search results immediately before trademark 
litigation in order to increase its chances of winning.77  This results in an untenable 
situation where searchers cannot fully understand the algorithm behind searches but 
also cannot be sure that algorithm is actually being used in any given case.78 
Lack of transparency in search algorithms also exacerbates the problem of “self-
fulfilling prophecies,” which arise when a top-ranked site ends up being the most 
prestigious or profitable, not on account of its intrinsic qualities, but only because it 
was top-ranked to begin with.  Few people are better acquainted with this 
phenomenon than law school faculty, whose schools are largely ranked according to 
“reputational” scores in U.S. News & World Report which are themselves an artifact 
of past rankings.79  Nearly all the participants at a recent symposium on law school 
rankings criticized U.S. News & World Report’s annual effort to ordinally rank law 
                                                                
75See Orin Kerr, SSRN as a Measure of Scholarly Performance, The Volokh Conspiracy, 
Aug. 16, 2005, available at http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2005_08_14-2005_08_20. 
shtml#1124241868 (discussing potential “gaming” of downloads by professors who download 
their own papers (or develop perl script to do so)).    
76See Suzanne Scotchmer and Pamela Samuelson, The Law and Economics of Reverse 
Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575 (2002). 
77See Search King, Inc., 2003 WL 21464568, at *2; BATTELLE, supra note 21, at 183-86. 
78Similar problems afflict the credit bureaus, whose leaders’ methods are also protected by 
trade secret protection.  Concerned about possibly racist elements of credit ratings, several 
states have banned the use of consumer credit scores in the setting of insurance premia.   
79See Jeffery Evans Stake, The Interplay Between Law School Rankings, Reputations, and 
Resource Allocation, 81 IND. L.J. 229, 250 (2006) (“The schools ranked highly by U.S. News 
moved up in faculty reputation score and tended to stay there, and the schools that got low 
initial rankings moved down.  In other words, the rankings were reflexive; there was an echo 
effect.”) (citing Brian Leiter, Commentary, How to Rank Law Schools, 81 IND. L J. 47, 51 
(2006)).  But see Richard Smalbeck, The Durability of Law School Reputation, 48 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 568, 585 n.21, 586 (1998) (disputing the self-fulfilling prophecy characterization).  
Stake offers several reasons to doubt Schmalbeck’s complacency about the self-fulfilling 
prophecy effect of the U.S. News rankings, including effects on lawyer reputation scores 
“significant at the 0.001 level.”  Stake, supra, at 253. 
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schools—including those usually enamored of untrammeled competitive struggle.80  
Educational rankings remain entirely unregulated, despite bitter complaints from 
some of the ranked and the growing sense that they have catalyzed a self-destructive 
arms race among schools.  If any one search engine becomes as dominant in the 
general ranking field as U.S. News is in the law school field, similar dynamics may 
be unleashed in many other spheres.81 
Unless search engines use their revenues to cross-subsidize socially useful 
projects, adword bidding wars may prove extraordinarily wasteful.  To the extent 
that such information is used as a tool for competing in zero-sum games, it is unclear 
whether the production of more information is either efficient or equitable.  For 
instance, imagine the development of an innovative method of moving up in search 
results, which sells for  $10,000.  Though the number of users of such a method may 
be small, they will nevertheless manage to leverage financial advantage into 
notoriety.  Moreover, even if the price of the method goes down, inequity persists 
until it is universally accessible.  This inequity persists because the more accessible 
the method is, the greater the pressure to use it (spreading its cost more generally), 
and the greater the disadvantage suffered by those who don’t use it (increasing the 
penalty for non-participation).  But perversely, once the method becomes universally 
accessible, it will afford no one a positional advantage, because one can only rise in 
rank relative to others.  Therefore, the innovative method either generates some 
inequity or inefficiency, since universal accessibility destroys the only value of the 
method—the ability to raise one’s score relative to others. 
This example suggests a more general theory regarding the development of 
primarily position-enhancing information (PPEI) like adwords and search engine 
gaming techniques.  First, the development of such information immediately divides 
society into two groups—those who can afford to buy or use the information and 
those who cannot.  Thus the innovation commodifies notoriety.  Moreover, even 
                                                                
80See, e.g., Leiter, supra note 79; Richard A. Posner, The Next Generation of Law School 
Rankings: Framing the Rankings Debate: Law School Rankings, 81 IND. L.J. 13 (2006); 
Stake, supra note 79.  But see Russell Korobkin, In Praise of Law School Rankings: Solutions 
to Coordination and Collective Action Problems, 77 TEX. L. REV. 403 (1998) (“Students read 
and value rankings because they know that attending a highly-ranked school signals their 
quality to desirable employers, who also study the rankings in order to interpret these signals. 
This coordination function is served whether or not the rankings accurately measure the 
quality of law schools, however defined.”). 
81This is not merely a parochial concern of legal educators; recall the Pentagon’s quick 
decision to scrap a prediction market in terrorism.  Both rankings and prediction markets are 
dangerous as self-fulfilling prophecies. For example, in American elections, a candidate will 
often pull ahead of another candidate on a site called Tradesports, which gives “odds” on 
electoral and other competitions.  This putative advantage can quickly become real, as 
investing donors (especially those seeking help from the government) tip to the more likely 
winner.  For this reason, Roger Shattuck suggests that this is a type of information that is best 
kept private.  ROGER SHATTUCK, FORBIDDEN KNOWLEDGE (1996).  But see Cass Sunstein, 
Group Judgments: Statistical Means, Deliberation, and Information Markets, 80 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 962, 1048 (2005) (arguing that “information markets [like Tradesports] . . . tend to 
correct, rather than to amplify, the effects of individual errors. . . . [and] create powerful 
incentives to disclose, rather than to conceal, privately held information.”); Tom Bell, The 
Prediction Exchange: Progress in Promoting the Sciences and Useful Arts, 
http://www.tomwbell.com/writings/PredEx.pdf.   
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though the group that can afford access to the PPEI is advantaged relative to those 
who cannot, the development of PPEI may be inefficient for that group as well.  The 
benefit of distancing itself from those who cannot afford the information may well be 
outweighed by the cost of access.  And precisely to the extent that this cost is 
lowered, the positional advantage afforded by the innovation dissipates.  In other 
words, PPEI creates inequity when it first arises and inefficiency as it becomes more 
universally accessible.   
Even if such commercial competition is deemed an inevitable accompaniment of 
markets, pervasive ranking also threatens to coarsen culture by encouraging a false 
sense of commensurability.  Consider Richard Posner’s recent effort to “rank” public 
intellectuals, a laborious project made ever easier by the powerful computing 
systems driving search engines.82  There is no way to make a ranking process "fair" 
unless we subscribe to the bizarre idea that the quality of the work of economists, 
historians, philosophers, scientists, et al. can be ordinally ranked with some 
commensurating metric.83  The danger is particularly acute in social sciences and 
literature, where quality is hard to measure and notoriety often becomes a substitute 
for it.84  Only positivistic delusion could lead us to ignore the contestability of the 
basic assumptions and aspirations of authors in such fields--for example, how closely 
tied they are to visions of the good society and ideological commitments.  Yet the 
temptation to assess the importance and even quality of a person’s intellectual work 
with reference to the number of “hits” they generate on a search engine database is 
sure to advance as these services play a greater role in our lives. 
                                                                
82RICHARD POSNER, PUBLIC INTELLECTUALS: A STUDY IN DECLINE (2001).  Posner ranked 
the “importance” of public intellectuals by counting the number of times they were quote in 
Lexis databases.  See id. at 209-11, table 5.3 ("Top 100 public intellectuals by media mentions 
(1995-2000)”); id. at 212-14, table 5.4 ("Top 100 public intellectuals by scholarly citations 
(1995-2000)”).  There is an excellent collection of critiques of Posner’s project at Reactions to 
Posner’s Public Intellectuals, Complete Review, COMPLETE REVIEW QUARTERLY, May, 2002, 
http://www.complete-review.com/quarterly/vol3/issue2/posner.htm (last visited May 25, 
2006).   
83For a normative defense of incommensurability, see MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF 
JUSTICE (1978); Michael Walzer, Response to Critics, in PLURALISM, JUSTICE, AND EQUALITY 
281 (David Miller, ed., 1995); Brian Leiter, Incommensurability: Truth or Consequences? 146 
U. PENN. L. REV. 1723 (1998)  
84See, e.g., LEO BRAUDY, THE FRENZY OF RENOWN: FAME AND ITS HISTORY (1997); JAMES 
F. ENGLISH, THE ECONOMY OF PRESTIGE: PRIZES, AWARDS AND THE CIRCULATION OF 
CULTURAL VALUE (2005) (describing the proliferation of prizes for expression); Tim Harford, 
What Really Counts, FIN. TIMES Jan. 28, 2006, at 12 (“Chicago-based economist David 
Galenson . . . recently demonstrated that Picasso was by far the greatest artist of the 20th 
century. Galenson’s method is simplicity itself: round up every art history textbook of the past 
15 years, and see whose art is reproduced most frequently. Picasso, with 395 illustrations in 33 
textbooks, scores nearly as many as his three closest rivals (Matisse, Duchamp and Mondrian) 
put together.”).  Although such developments may portend the extension of some of the worst 
aspects of celebrity culture into academia, they also do create some positive pressures.  For 
example, academics can no longer complacently permit their work to be locked into restrictive 
databases or books, for fear that their notoriety will decline as other, accessible work 
(approximating a good enough substitute for it) becomes a standard reference.  See Dan 
Hunter, Walled Gardens, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 607, 608-9 (discussing the advantages of 
open-access publishing).     
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B. Reducing Negative Externalities of Ranking 
None of the negative dynamics mentioned above is easy to measure.  Once a self-
fulfilling prophecy begins, it is nearly impossible to distinguish between legitimate 
and “echo chamber” aspects of a ranking.  Moreover, there is no direct solution to 
the problem of arms races for position, or the destructive dynamic of gaming and 
opacity in ranking algorithms.  Creeping misperceptions of commensurability may 
be more of a cultural than a legal problem.  Nevertheless, all of these problems may 
be ameliorated if the stakes of any particular ranking diminish.  This can probably 
only occur if more search engines enter a currently concentrated market, or if 
government intervenes to make extant search engines present their results more 
responsibly. 
A diversity of search engines would make the results of any particular ranking far 
less consequential.  It would also make the search field less vulnerable to gaming.  
Some search engines could continue to make their ranking algorithms opaque, while 
others might compete with an “open standard.”  Search engines might concentrate on 
particular fields, developing algorithms that are particularly sensitive to the concerns 
of particular searchers or web publishers.   
Unfortunately, in the rough and tumble world of online competition and 
consolidation, a “peaceable kingdom” of diverse search engines is unlikely to 
develop.  This reality makes a baseline of accountability for dominant search engine 
results all the more important.  The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) took an 
important first step in this direction by warning search engines to clearly distinguish 
between paid and unpaid search listings, lest the former constitute a form of false 
advertising.85  The FTC could further advance fair competition in the search market 
by requiring large search engines to put in place basic procedural protections for 
those potentially harmed by query results.86   
C. Addressing Harm from Inclusion in Highly-Ranked Results 
Just as major credit bureaus must respond to consumers’ allegations that a piece 
of information on their credit report is false or misleading, complaints about false or 
misleading search results on major search engines should lead to more than polite 
advice about self-help or a price list for adwords.  When meritorious, such 
complaints should result in the right to give one’s own side of the story.87  A small 
                                                                
85See Reuters, Search Engine Providers Address FTC Complaints, USA TODAY, July 2, 
2002, available at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2002/07/02/ftc-search-engines.htm 
(discussing the FTC response to Public Citizen complaint letter about Alta Vista). 
86In future work, I hope to work out a comparative institutional analysis in order to 
develop some potential legal reforms to respond to these concerns.  See, e.g., NEIL KOMESAR, 
IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 
3-4 (1997) (advocating comparative institutional analysis before policy prescriptions).      
87For individuals, this might amount to an asterisk leading to a refuting or clarifying site.  
For companies, the remedy might include an asterisk next to unfair competitor’s entry.  If, for 
example, I own the trademark “Oh-So-Con” for convenience stores, and someone else’s store 
comes up first in an Google search for “Oh-So-Con,” I could have an asterisk next to the 
hyperlink to that entry, and the asterisk would lead to a page that would permit to explain that 
I own the mark.   
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asterisk next to the offending result, linked to the complainant’s own website, would 
accomplish this at minimal cost to the affected search engine.88 
Search engines will likely resist such regulation by pointing to SearchKing’s 
characterization of ranking as opinion protected by the First Amendment.  Wouldn’t 
such an asterisk constitute precisely the type of “forced speech” ruled 
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in GLIB v. Hurley?89  When California voters 
attempted to place three dollar signs (“$$$”) next to the ballot entries of candidates 
who had engaged in certain disfavored campaign funding practices, this “compelled 
speech” was quickly ruled unconstitutional.90  What is to prevent similar First 
Amendment absolutism from protecting search engines’ right to produce whatever 
rankings they want?   
Setting aside the intricacies of First Amendment doctrine for now, the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act (FCRA) appears to provide a clear precedent for limiting metadata 
providers’ capacity to provide whatever accounts of data they deem fit.  The FCRA 
requires credit bureaus to permit individuals to dispute negative information on their 
credit reports and to give their own side of the story on reports generated for 
potential creditors, insurers, and employers.  Applied to search engines, such 
protections would merely permit those dogged by negative information in search 
engines to put an asterisk next to the metadata indexing the information which would 
be hyperlinked to “their side of the story.”91  The asterisk is not speech itself, but 
merely a way of restructuring a forum with deep roots in our First Amendment 
tradition. 
                                                                
88Scholars have only recently realized the power of asterisks to send all manner of signals.  
See, e.g., ANTHONY GRAFTON, THE FOOTNOTE: A CURIOUS HISTORY (2003); Charles Sullivan, 
The Undertheorized Asterisk Footnote, 93 GEO. L.J. 1093, 1094 (2005) (discussing evolution 
of “asterisk footnote” in law review articles.).  
89See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557 (1995); Boy 
Scouts v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 656 (2000) (ruling that civil rights laws could not force 
institutions to send a “pro-gay” message by including gays in their activities).  The Supreme 
Court will likely limit this doctrine in Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc. v. 
Rumsfeld, in 2006 by reversing a Third Circuit opinion that relied on Dale in order to overturn 
the Solomon Amendment (which had effectively prevented law schools from banning military 
recruiters) on the basis of expressive and associational autonomy. 390 F.3d 219, 230 (3d Cir. 
2004), rev’d, 126 S. Ct. 1297 (2006).    
90Cal. Prolife Council Political Action Comm. v. Scully, No. CIV.S-96-1965 at 16 (E.D. 
Cal. Mar. 1, 2001), available at http://www.law.ucla.edu/faculty/bios/lowenste/slatemailorder. 
pdf ("Statutes compelling speech, like those forbidding speech, address matter well within the 
protection of the First Amendment."); Shanto Iyengar, Daniel H. Lowenstein, & Seth Masket, 
The Stealth Campaign: Experimental Studies of Slate Mail in California, 17 J.L. & POL. 295 
(2001) (noting that “the requirement for dollar signs instead of asterisks, and the requirement 
that $50,000 contributors to ballot measure campaigns be disclosed on the face of a slate 
mailer” were ruled unconstitutional).  Full background on the case is available at California 
Prolife Council Political Action Committee v. Scully, 989 F.Supp. 1282 (E.D.Cal.1998).  
91The asterisk might also provide a good way to settle disputes over trademarked adwords.  
For example, if a user types in “American Blinds” as a query, and a number of competitors 
appear as results, perhaps American Blinds should have the right to put an asterisk next to 
each result in order to indicate that the competitor is not actually the source legally designated 
by the trademarked words American Blinds.   
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Federal regulation along the lines of FCRA would also offer some comfort to 
dominant search engines if it resulted in a preemption of state law liability.  The 
SearchKing court was correct to worry that state unfair competition, defamation, and 
false light claims could lead to de facto judicial regulation of search and an 
unwieldly expansion of secondary liability.  Moreover, permitting such lawsuits 
would probably only entrench dominant search engines, as they are the only players 
with the resources to consistently defend against them.   
D. Addressing Harm from Exclusion from Results 
As the stories in Part IV demonstrate, search engine results can be arbitrary and 
capricious, suddenly dropping individuals who built their livelihoods and reputations 
on high rankings.92  Sometimes drops in ranking result from understandable efforts to 
assure the integrity of ranking algorithms.93  However, more suspect manipulations 
have also been documented.  John Battelle relates the following stunning turn of 
events in the American Blinds case: 
September 17, 2004 was the day the San Jose District Court was to hear 
arguments in the American Blinds case [regarding a dispute over the 
trademarked adwords “American Blinds”]. . . . Google had filed a motion 
to dismiss. . . .[When a] member of American Blinds’ legal team . . . 
[attempted to] test the system, he brought up Google and entered what had 
become a habitual search query: “American Blinds.” . . . . Every [other] 
time someone entered ‘American Blinds’ into Google’s search field, 
competitors to American Blinds came up on the screen.   
Only this morning, for some reason, they did not. 
The lawyer suspected Google had changed its results, and called 
colleagues in other parts of the country.  Sure enough, searches in other 
regions returned different results, including the potentially infringing 
advertisements. . . . The lawyer quickly documented his findings.94 
Despite this evidence, Google’s PR team claimed that “‘Google would certainly 
never do such a thing’” and attributed the discrepancy to a technical glitch.95   
As long as ranking algorithms are a “black box,” such potentially troubling 
practices are likely to continue—and perhaps become more undetectable.  Given the 
strength of IP protection of search algorithms,96 it is unlikely that proposals to make 
                                                                
92See, for example, the story of Neil Moncrief, the proprietor of 2bigfeet.com (a seller of 
large-sized men’s shoes), whose site was knocked off the first page of Google’s rankings by a 
sudden algorithm shift in November, 2003, right before the Christmas buying season. 
BATTELLE, supra note 21, at 157.  Moncrief attempted to contact Google several times, but 
“never got a response.”  Id.. 
93Id. at 157-59 (describing a particular intervention, dubbed “Florida,” designed to thwart 
illicit “search engine optimization” techniques). 
94Id. at 184.    
95Id. 
96Such algorithms may be protected by copyright, trade secret, and patent protections.  
Moreover, some courts have suggested that revisions to such laws might constitute 
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ranking methods transparent can succeed.97  However, those hurt by sudden changes 
in ranking should have some opportunity to learn about what caused the change.  Just 
as credit bureaus must report to consumers the nature of “adverse information” that 
makes their credit reports less than perfect, search engines should have some 
responsibility to reveal the reasons for their re-rankings to those adversely affected.  
Though such information may prove anodyne at first, scrutiny might eventually 
reveal any overly self-serving or unfair manipulations of rank.98  Moreover, search 
engines cannot complain that these minor revelations would overly burden their 
business—the credit rating agencies still manages to keep the exact nature of their 
most important scoring mechanisms (such as the FICO score) a tightly-held secret. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Automation has increased the amount and sped the dissemination of information 
exponentially over the past few decades.  Research tasks that would have taken a 
team of assistants days or weeks can now be completed by a computer in seconds.99  
Search engine databases index information equal (by some measures) to all that was 
                                                           
compensable takings.  See, e.g., Philip Morris v. Reilly, 312 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2002); Monsanto 
v. Ruckelshaus, 753 F.2d 649, 651 (8th Cir. 1985).  For an effort to clarify and extend this 
caselaw, see Adam Mossoff and Eric Claeys, Patents, Prices, and Property: Drug Patents and 
the Takings Clause, Lecture at Benjamin Cardozo School of Law Intellectual Property 
Conference (August 2005) (setting forth rationales for applying regulatory takings doctrine to 
IP).  
97Nissenbaum and Introna proposed such a “transparency” rule as a sine qua non of search 
engine reform.  Introna & Nissenbaum, supra note 61, at 32: 
As a first step we would demand full and truthful disclosure of the underlying rules (or 
algorithms) governing indexing, searching, and prioritizing, stated in a way that is 
meaningful to the majority of Web users.  Obviously, this might help spammers.  
However, we would argue that the impact of these unethical practices would be 
severely dampened if both seekers and those wishing to be found are aware of the 
particular biases inherent in any given search engine.  We believe informing users, on 
the whole, will be better than the status quo, in spite of the difficulties.  Those who 
favor a market mechanism would perhaps be pleased to note that disclosure would 
move us closer to fulfilling the criteria of an ideal competitive market in search 
engines.  Disclosure is a step in the right direction because it would lead to a clearer 
grasp of what is at stake in selecting among the various search engines, which in turn 




98Particularly if the secret ranking algorithm is held “in escrow” by an independent 
agency, which can verify the validity of reasons given for changes.  See, e.g., Dan L. Burk and 
Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for Rights Management Systems, 15 HARV. J. L. & 
TECH. 41 (2001) (proposing keeping digital “keys” to digital rights management software “in 
escrow” for government authorities who could “unlock” the material in response to legitimate 
request for “fair use” of it). 
99For example, compare the process of “shephardizing” a case in “the books” to the 
“keycite” feature on Westlaw, or the computerized “Shephard’s” offered by Lexis. 
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thought and written before their advent.100  Advanced algorithms can now organize 
and categorize this data in a remarkable number of ways. 
Nevertheless, as search engines become more authoritative, encompassing more 
and more sources of data, they become capable of harms commensurate with their 
benefits.  So far public attention has focused on privacy concerns raised by these data 
aggregators’ storage of all search requests connected to given users.101  Major players 
in the “creative industries” have also claimed that search engines will “Napsterize” 
their content or lead to a digital “Wal-Mart” capable of squeezing content providers 
as effectively as the brick-and-mortar retail behemoth drives down the prices it pays 
its suppliers.  
Though both these concerns are important, they focus on likely effects of search 
engines, and not on the ranking process itself.  Courts have largely failed to hold that 
process up to normative scrutiny, preferring instead to view search engine results as 
both 1) unregulable speech that is but one more contribution to the marketplace of 
ideas; and 2) an automated result not susceptible to the kind of moral judgment we 
usually reserve for humans. 
This piece argues that neither justification for leaving search engine results 
unregulated is convincing.  Search engines are not merely one more voice in a 
pluralistic public dialogue, but are poised to become the chief organizer and forum 
for research, public discussion, and commercial competition among internet users.  
Moreover, the same automated processes that make search engine results so rapid, 
useful, and flexible can also be deployed to make them more fair and responsible.  
Rather than hiding behind the mechanical application of First Amendment 
protections, new public fora like search engines should promote the First 
Amendment goal of open public forums.  Only an ongoing concern for the policy 
behind freedom of expression will make that legal “neighborhood” an ameliorative 
influence on the gated privatopia of IP law it borders.102 
                                                                
100See Peter Lyman & Hal R. Varian, How Much Information 2003, http://www.sims. 
berkeley.edu:8000/research/projects/how-much-info-2003/.  Note that the title of the survey is 
not How Much Wisdom?. 
101Though long a concern of groups like the Electronic Privacy Information Center, this 
controversy only received sustained attention with Google’s resistance of the federal 
government’s subpoena of search requests.  Google, however, did not resist the subpoena on 
the basis of the privacy rights of its users, but rather because (it claimed) the information could 
disclose company trade secrets. 
102See, e.g., EVAN MCKENZIE, PRIVATOPIA: HOMEOWNERS’ ASSOCIATIONS AND THE RISE OF 
RESIDENTIAL PRIVATE GOVERNMENT 177 (1994); Lee Ann Fennell, Contracting Communities, 
2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 829, 832 (2004).  Though the influence of free speech and competition 
law on IP law holds great promise, contracts of adhesion and paracopyright-like protections 
may ultimately render it a hermetically “gated community,” incapable of absorbing the norms 
of other, more progressive milieux. 
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